Fort Jackson &
Fort St. Philip

April 16-28, 1862

Early Union plans had called for the division of the Confederacy by seizing control of the Mississippi River. One of the first steps in such operations was to enter the mouth of the Mississippi River, ascend to New Orleans and capture the city, closing off the entrance to Rebel ships. In mid-January 1862, Flag-Officer David G. Farragut undertook this enterprise with his West Gulf Blockading Squadron. The way was soon open except for the two forts, Jackson and St. Philip, above the Head of the Passes, approximately seventy miles below New Orleans. In addition to the forts and their armament, the Confederates had placed obstructions in the river and there were a number of ships, including two ironclads, to assist in the defense. Farragut based his operations from Ship Island, Mississippi, and on April 8, he assembled 24 of his vessels and Comdr. David D. Porter's 19 mortar schooners near the Head of the Passes. Starting on the 16th and continuing for seven days, the mortar schooners bombarded Fort Jackson but failed to silence its guns. Some of Farragut's gunboats opened a way through the obstruction on the night of the 22nd. Early on the morning of the 24th, Farragut sent his ships north to pass the forts and head for New Orleans. Although the Rebels attempted to stop the Union ships in various ways, most of the force successfully passed the forts and continued on to New Orleans where Farragut accepted the city's surrender. With the passage of the forts, nothing could stop the Union forces: the fall of New Orleans was inevitable and anti-climatic. Cut off and surrounded, the garrisons of the two forts surrendered on the 28th. Result(s): Union victory

The prime defenses of New Orleans were Fort Jackson and Fort St Philip, both located on a bend of the Mississippi, 75 miles to the South of New Orleans. The Confederates considered them impregnable. By Mid April the federal fleet arrived just below the forts. The fleet included a number of mortar boats, which were especially designed to lob large shells at forts. On April 18th 1862 the mortar boats opened fire. Porter, who commanded the mortar fleet was convinced he could destroy the forts in two days. For almost a week he fired 16,800 shells at the forts. Despite this heavy bombardment he was unable to disable the guns of the forts. Farragut called off the shelling and instead decided to run the gauntlet of the forts with his fleet.


The fleet was powerful consisting of seventeen warships. At 2 AM on the morning of April 24th Farragut ordered the fleet forward. They ran the gauntlet of the fort and then came upon the small confederate fleet which they annihilated. All told one federal warship was sunk and three were seriously damaged, 37 union sailors were killed and 149 wounded. Farragut then continued upriver unchallenged, where New Orleans, the South's largest port and second largest city was forced to surrender. The next day the soldiers in the two forts below the city mutinied and the forts surrendered.

Flag-Officer David Glasgow Farragut (1801-1870)

Lincoln and McClellan both agreed on the importance of capturing New Orleans and the resources necessary -- a rare unanimity. In December 1861 Farragut was assigned command of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

Sometimes you have a commander where it's impossible to separate talent from luck. Farragut falls into this category. His sole contribution was understanding that the key was getting past the forts and not much else.The actual battle was noted more for confusion than brilliance, but in the end the Confederates just happened to be more confused.

Farragut's approach to New Orleans was one part of Winfield (Old Fuss and Feathers) Scott's larger Anaconda Strategy to win the war. A key element called for a naval blockade of the South, which was the only coherent  and successful aspect of Union strategy early in the war.

After the blockade, Union plans called for seizing control of the Mississippi River. One of the first steps in such operations was to enter the mouth of the Mississippi River, move to New Orleans and capture the city, closing off the entrance to shipping. Once the Crescent City fell, the Union could continue on upstream until he met the warships of the Western Flotilla which were fighting their way down from the Ohio and upper Mississippi. While the plan was simple, the obstacles were formidable.

There is always the stock phrase how control of the Mississippi would "split the Confederacy in two." Well, not quite. Controlling the railheads across the River would deprive the east of foodstuffs from Texas and manufactured goods trans-shipped from Matamoros, Mexico. This was the whole point of Vicksburg.

The whole naval campaign is complex: blue water (ocean), brown water (coastal and riverine), and amphibious landings. Sealing off the Confederate Gulf coast between Pensacola and the mouth of the Rio Grande was an enormous task. The mission, equipment, and tactical problems were massive, and in the end it was fantastically successful, from the gunboats at Henry and Donelson to the ocean-going Navy at the Head of the Passes. In the end, the Navy was ready and the Army wasn't.

By the end of 1861 the U.S. Navy had assembled 200 ships of every description, armed them after a fashion, and placed them on station for a strategic blockade. New Congressional acts regarding piracy, revenue, confiscation, and enforcement in hand, let the commanders intercept more and more swift blockade runners steaming out of Nassau, Bermuda, and Havana on their three-day run to Wilmington, North Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia. In two round trips a blockade runner, even if lost on its third voyage, still produced a considerable profit to its owner. By the end of 1861 such profit was no longer easy, because the Navy had many new fast ships in service, specially fitted for blockade duty.

After 1861 the naval character of the war changed. There was no Civil War on the high seas except for the exciting exploits of three or four Confederate cruisers which raided commercial shipping. As the war progressed, both opponents perfected the nature and construction of ships and naval ordnance for a war that would be fought in coastal waters or inside defensible harbors. The three main weapons, the rifled naval gun, the armored ram, and the torpedo mine, were developed and used in novel ways.

To offset the defensive use of these weapons by the South, the Federal Navy beginning in August 1861 landed more and more Army expeditionary forces and gradually obtained footholds in the vicinity of Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington. By the end of the war, joint Navy-Army expeditions would convert the sea blockade into a military occupation and would seal off all major ports in the South.

New Orleans is a nice illustration of just how disorganized the Confederacy was. While they would fight to the death over a place like Pittsburg Landing, they would casually abandon Memphis, Nashville, and New Orleans after negligible resistance.

Aside from the blockade-running aspects, New Orleans represented a major political factor totally misunderstood by Jefferson Davis and people who should have known better. It was the largest city in the newly-formed Confederacy; it was international; and it had strong ties to France. Thus, aside from any economic considerations, the safety of New Orleans would validate the Confederacy as being able to protect its own valuable real estate.

Expedition to, and Capture of, New Orleans [April-May 1862] Forts Jackson & St. Philip New Orleans